4(1) A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a personal assistance service if the person is able to understand the information that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, admission or personal assistance service, as the case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.The Act presumes that everyone has such capacity.
Two such appeals recently came before the OCA, and were reported in the same decision.Like the woman in the documentary, the first of the two patients, Mr. Barker, denied that he suffers from a mental illness. He wished to refuse his medication. The evidence was that he was incapable and that his medication would ameliorate his illness, if not cure it. His issues on appeal dealt with both the finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment and the ancillary treatment issue. The second patient, Mr. Mitchell, was aware that he suffered from a mental illness. He vacillated, however, between accepting that his medication would help and denying that it would. His stated incapacity was that he was incapable of appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his lack of treatment. Mr. Mitchell’s sole issue on appeal was the ancillary treatment issue.
Authority to consent to a treatment on an incapable person’s behalf includes the authority to consent to another treatment that is necessary and ancillary to the treatment, even if the incapable person is capable with respect to the necessary and ancillary treatment.In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes, the SCC had made it clear that the first rule of statutory interpretation was to base it on the plain and ordinary meaning of the wording used. Here the OCA read section 23 to mean:
...once a determination is made with respect to the incapacity of an individual to consent to treatment, the resulting authority to administer treatment carries with it the authority to administer “another treatment that is necessary and ancillary” to the primary treatment. No further or separate finding of incapacity is necessary for that authority nor is any separate order required. Indeed, s. 23 expressly provides that the authority results “even if the incapable person is capable with respect to the necessary and ancillary treatment”. In my view, the wording of the section could not be clearer.Both Mr. Barker and Mr. Mitchell argued that there should be a capacity hearing on ancillary treatment either initially or when the need arose. This position was rejected by the OCA for practical reasons. The main one was the delay such a further step would require. As an example, Mr. Barker’s case had now dragged on for two years without his being administered his medication. The Intervener in the case, The Empowerment Council, argued for a very narrow definition of what ancillary treatments would properly be considered necessary. This position was also rejected by the OCA as being impracticable, overly restrictive and contrary to the wording of the section. The practice that has developed of assuming an incapacity for ancillary care when such a finding was made for primary treatment, is wrong. Such a finding is unnecessary given the plain meaning of s.23. The section provides the solution and should be used in that way. At Wise Health Law, we focus on health and administrative law, including matters relating to consent and capacity. Our lawyers have significant trial and appellate experience and are passionate about helping health professionals and healthcare organizations understand and protect their legal rights. If you are a capacity assessor facing a review of your decision or are involved in another issue before the Consent and Capacity Board, contact us. We will guide you through the Board process, help you understand potential risks and legal implications, and assist you with or skillfully represent you at the proceedings Based on our highly-specialized knowledge and experience in healthcare litigation, we often receive referrals from other lawyers and legal professionals. Contact us online, or at 416-915-4234 for a consultation.
Earlier this year, Wise Health Law succeeded on a motion for summary judgment in a dental malpractice case on the basis that the limitation period had expired before the Statement of Claim was issued. The (unreported) decision was delivered orally on the day of the motion.
In part, the plaintiff argued that she did not discover her claim until the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (the “RCDSO” or “College”) rendered its decision, as she did not know if the defendant was negligent when she complained to the RCDSO, but merely had a “suspicion”.
In the midst of COVID-19, the proceedings of many health colleges, and consequently of the health professionals they regulate, have been in limbo while everyone finds a way forward.
On March 25, 2020, the Ontario government enacted the Hearings in Tribunal Proceedings (Temporary Measures) Act, 2020 (the “Act”) to help the process along.
The Act empowers statutory tribunals with more discretion over how proceedings before them are held.
Effective 11:59 p.m. on March 24, 2020, the Ontario government ordered the closure of “non-essential” workplaces. The list of “essential” workplaces included “health care professionals providing emergency care including dentists, optometrists and physiotherapists”.
The College of Chiropractors of Ontario (“CCO”) interprets this list as including chiropractors, and we agree.
So the question becomes – what is “emergency care”?