4(1) A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a personal assistance service if the person is able to understand the information that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, admission or personal assistance service, as the case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.The Act presumes that everyone has such capacity.
Two such appeals recently came before the OCA, and were reported in the same decision.Like the woman in the documentary, the first of the two patients, Mr. Barker, denied that he suffers from a mental illness. He wished to refuse his medication. The evidence was that he was incapable and that his medication would ameliorate his illness, if not cure it. His issues on appeal dealt with both the finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment and the ancillary treatment issue. The second patient, Mr. Mitchell, was aware that he suffered from a mental illness. He vacillated, however, between accepting that his medication would help and denying that it would. His stated incapacity was that he was incapable of appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his lack of treatment. Mr. Mitchell’s sole issue on appeal was the ancillary treatment issue.
Authority to consent to a treatment on an incapable person’s behalf includes the authority to consent to another treatment that is necessary and ancillary to the treatment, even if the incapable person is capable with respect to the necessary and ancillary treatment.In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes, the SCC had made it clear that the first rule of statutory interpretation was to base it on the plain and ordinary meaning of the wording used. Here the OCA read section 23 to mean:
...once a determination is made with respect to the incapacity of an individual to consent to treatment, the resulting authority to administer treatment carries with it the authority to administer “another treatment that is necessary and ancillary” to the primary treatment. No further or separate finding of incapacity is necessary for that authority nor is any separate order required. Indeed, s. 23 expressly provides that the authority results “even if the incapable person is capable with respect to the necessary and ancillary treatment”. In my view, the wording of the section could not be clearer.Both Mr. Barker and Mr. Mitchell argued that there should be a capacity hearing on ancillary treatment either initially or when the need arose. This position was rejected by the OCA for practical reasons. The main one was the delay such a further step would require. As an example, Mr. Barker’s case had now dragged on for two years without his being administered his medication. The Intervener in the case, The Empowerment Council, argued for a very narrow definition of what ancillary treatments would properly be considered necessary. This position was also rejected by the OCA as being impracticable, overly restrictive and contrary to the wording of the section. The practice that has developed of assuming an incapacity for ancillary care when such a finding was made for primary treatment, is wrong. Such a finding is unnecessary given the plain meaning of s.23. The section provides the solution and should be used in that way. At Wise Health Law, we focus on health and administrative law, including matters relating to consent and capacity. Our lawyers have significant trial and appellate experience and are passionate about helping health professionals and healthcare organizations understand and protect their legal rights. If you are a capacity assessor facing a review of your decision or are involved in another issue before the Consent and Capacity Board, contact us. We will guide you through the Board process, help you understand potential risks and legal implications, and assist you with or skillfully represent you at the proceedings Based on our highly-specialized knowledge and experience in healthcare litigation, we often receive referrals from other lawyers and legal professionals. Contact us online, or at 416-915-4234 for a consultation.
As of July 1, 2021, all Ontario long-term care homes must implement COVID-19 immunization policies for their staff, students, and volunteers — regardless of the frequency or duration of these individuals’ attendance in a home. Current staff, students, and volunteers will have until July 31, 2021 to meet the policy requirements, subject to reasonable extension for unforeseen circumstances. Newly hired individuals will have 30 days from the first day they begin attending at the home.
It is no surprise that the COVID-19 pandemic continues to affect the delivery of health services and the regulation of various health professions.
In a welcomed move, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) Council recently approved a new registration policy allowing the Registration Committee to issue a Certificate of Registration authorizing Independent Practice to applicants who have not completed Part II of the Medical Council of Canada Qualifying Examination (MCCQE).
The test for the standard of care in medical negligence cases has remained untouched since the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1995 decision in ter Neuzen v. Korn.
On January 18, 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal in Armstrong v. Ward. Their unanimous decision maintains the status quo with respect to the standard of care in medical negligence cases.