The Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) released its groundbreaking decision of Jones v. Tsige in 2012. The common law in Ontario for the very first time recognized the right to bring a civil action for damages for an invasion of personal privacy, or intrusion upon seclusion. Until then it was unclear if the law did recognize such a cause of action.
The ONCA set out the elements of the new privacy tort as follows:
I would essentially adopt as the elements of the action for intrusion upon seclusion the Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010) formulation which, for the sake of convenience, I repeat here:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The key features of this cause of action are, first, that the defendant's conduct must be intentional, within which I would include reckless; second that the defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff's private affairs or concerns; and third, that a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish. However, proof of harm to a recognized economic interest is not an element of the cause of action. I return below to the question of damages, but state here that I believe it important to emphasize that given the intangible nature of the interest protected, damages for intrusion upon seclusion will ordinarily be measured by a modest conventional sum.
The court also set some limitations to the action, in an attempt to reign in unreasonable causes of action:
These elements make it clear that recognizing this cause of action will not open the floodgates. A claim for intrusion upon seclusion will arise only for deliberate and significant invasions of personal privacy. Claims from individuals who are sensitive or unusually concerned about their privacy are excluded: it is only intrusions into matters such as one's financial or health records, sexual practices and orientation, employment, diary or private correspondence that, viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard, can be described as highly offensive.
The Superior Court of Justice (ONSC) had to deal with the tort in Broutzas v. Rouge Valley Health System (2018). The decision combined two actions seeking the certification of class actions against two hospitals, three of their employees, and several investment dealers. The employees had, in violation of their employment contracts and the Personal Health Information Protection Act, obtained the contact information concerning patients who had recently given birth at one of the two defendant hospitals. One employee used the information to solicit sales of Registered Education Savings Plans (RESP) from the patients. The other employees sold the information to investment dealers who then solicited the patients for the same purpose. No confidential health information was disclosed or used, only the contact information. The plaintiffs were the parents contacted and sought to rely on the privacy tort as one of their causes of action.
The ONSC dismissed this particular claim as follows:
It is plain and obvious in the case at bar that there is no tenable cause of action for intrusion on seclusion because there was no significant invasion of personal privacy and a reasonable person would not find the disclosure of contact information without the disclosure of medical, financial, or sensitive information, offensive or a cause for distress humiliation and anguish. The contact information that was the objective of the intrusion in the immediate case was not private, there was not a significant invasion of privacy, and the invasion of privacy was not highly offensive to an objective person.
Generally speaking, there is no privacy in information in the public domain, and there is no reasonable expectation in contact information, which is in the public domain, being a private matter. Contact information is publicly available and is routinely and readily disclosed to strangers to confirm one’s identification, age, or address. People readily disclose their address and phone number to bank and store clerks, when booking train or plane tickets or when ordering a taxi or food delivery. Many people use their health cards for identification purposes. Save during the first trimester, the state of pregnancy, and the birth of child is rarely a purely private matter. The news of an anticipated birth and of a birth is typically shared and celebrated with family, friends, and colleagues and is often publicized. The case at bar is illustrative. All the proposed representative plaintiffs were not shy about sharing the news of the newborns.
The decision is a welcome clarification on the scope of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. It tells us that not all information in a patient's medical chart is covered by the tort. Where information is publicly available, and usually shared with others, both of which occurred here, the tort does not attach. This was so despite the access being in contravention of several contracts as well as privacy legislation.
The lawyers at Wise Health Law, are passionate about helping health professionals and healthcare organizations understand their legal obligations with respect to patient privacy. We monitor trends and developments in the health sector so that we can provide consistently forward-thinking legal advice and risk management guidance to all of our clients. Our lawyers have significant trial and appellate experience and will skillfully represent clients whenever litigation is required. Contact us online, or at 416-915-4234 for a consultation.
In December 2019, Ontario’s Attorney General introduced Bill 161, the Smarter and Stronger Justice Act (the “Act”), which became law on July 8, 2020. The Act hopes to simplify a complex and outdated justice system by bringing changes to how legal aid services are delivered, how class actions are handled, and how court processes are administered.
Of note, the Act has amended the Judicial Review Procedures Act (JRPA) to establish new rules as to when an application for judicial review may be brought.
Any decisions made on or after July 8, 2020 are now subject to a 30-day limit for bringing an application for judicial review unless another Act provides otherwise. Courts, however, retain powers to extend the time for making an application for judicial review if satisfied that there are apparent grounds for relief and that no prejudice or hardship will be incurred by the delay. Before these amendments, the JRPA did not set out any time limits for bringing an application, but courts had powers to extend the time to bring an application if another Act prescribed the limit.
In early August 2020, the Federal Minister of Health granted an exemption under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) to four terminally ill Canadians to use psilocybin in their end of life care.
Psilocybin is one of the active ingredients/chemicals in “magic mushrooms,” the other is psilocin. Both psilocybin and psilocin are controlled substances under Schedule III of the CDSA. The sale, possession, production, etc. are prohibited unless authorized for clinical trial or research purposes under Part J of the Food and Drug Regulations. Both have been illegal in Canada since 1974. According to Health Canada, there are no approved therapeutic products containing psilocybin in Canada. However, the purified active ingredient, i.e. psilocybin, is being studied in supervised clinical settings for its potential to treat various conditions such as anxiety and depression.
The Chief Medical Officer of Health for Ontario has issued an updated Directive #2 (dated May 26, 2020) for Regulated Health Professionals in the province.
Pursuant to the updated Directive #2, all deferred non-essential and elective services by health care providers may be gradually restarted – subject to the rest of the requirements set out in the Directive.
The updated Directive #2 does not provide particularly detailed guidance to health professionals on how to proceed, likely because it applies to such a broad spectrum of health care and health professionals. It does, however, provide some principles to assist health care providers in making decisions as we enter this transitional period.